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ABSTRACT
A vast labor literature has found evidence of a “glass ceiling”, whereby women are under-represented
among senior management.  A key question remains the extent to which this reflects unobserved
differences in productivity, preferences, prejudice, or systematically biased beliefs about the ability
of female managers.  Disentangling these theories would require data on productivity, on the
preferences of those who interact with managers, and on perceptions of productivity.  Financial
markets provide continuous measures of the market’s perception of the value of firms, taking
account  of  the  beliefs  of  market  participants  about  the  ability  of  men  and  women in  senior
management.  As such, financial data hold the promise of potentially providing insight into the
presence of mistake-based discrimination.  Specifically if female-headed firms were systematically
under-estimated, this would suggest that female-headed firms would outperform expectations,
yielding excess returns.  Examining data on S&P 1500 firms over the period 1992-2004 I find no
systematic differences in returns to holding stock in female-headed firms, although this result reflects
the weak statistical power of our test, rather than a strong inference that financial markets either do
or do not under-estimate female CEOs.
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1.  Introduction 
A massive literature examining the labor market progress of women has found 
evidence of a “glass ceiling”, whereby women are under-represented in the top ranks of 
management.   Moreover, this result is usually robust to the inclusion of a rich set of 
control variables.  Broadly speaking, three sets of explanations have been offered to 
explain these observations.  First, there may be unobserved differences in productivity or 
preferences that are correlated with gender.  The second explanation relates 
discrimination to taste:  animus by co-workers or customers may be such that the firm’s 
marginal revenue product from promoting women is lower, or alternatively an employer 
may be willing to accept lower profits in order to avoid promoting women.  And third, it 
may be that the ability of women is systematically mis-assessed.  Disentangling these 
theories would require data on productivity, on the preferences of those who interact with 
workers, and on perceptions of productivity. 
Financial markets provide continuous measures of the market’s perception of the 
value of firms, taking account of the beliefs of market participants about the abilities of 
men and women in senior management.  As such, financial data hold the promise of 
potentially providing insight into the dynamics of discrimination, and specifically the 
persistence of biased beliefs about ability. 
Thus this paper proposes a test of mistake-based discrimination based on returns in 
financial markets.  Imagine that we ran a market in which traders bet on the performance 
of both male and female managers.  If expectations about the ability of women were 
systematically biased, then this would suggest that continually betting on strong female 
performance would yield excess returns.  While explicit prediction markets on the 2 
performance of male and female managers do not exist, in equity markets traders do take 
large positions based at least partly on their assessments of the ability of the CEO.  The 
joint null of efficient markets and no mis-assessment yields a particularly sharp set of 
testable implications: risk-adjusted returns to holding stock in female-headed firms 
should be equal to those of male-headed companies.  This paper tests whether financial 
data suggest that female-headed firms are priced as though the market under-estimates 
their true worth. 
Evidence of mistake-based discrimination is potentially interesting for a variety of 
reasons.  First, mistake-based discrimination is surely inefficient, while the case against 
taste- or statistical-based discrimination requires one to take an even stronger ethical 
position than simply appealing to a utilitarian calculus.  Second, if we found evidence 
that financial markets under-estimate the ability of women, this undermines the argument 
that effective capital markets are sufficiently profit-motivated that costly discrimination 
will not persist in equilibrium.  And third, excess returns can only persist if biased 
evaluations of ability are ubiquitous.  Even if many investors under-estimate female 
managers, excess returns should provide a sufficient inducement for the unbiased 
minority to buy female-headed firms, undoing the effects of the biased majority.  This 
latter argument is also crucial to thinking about the effects of discrimination in the labor 
market.  If only a few employers are biased, then in equilibrium we will see sorting of 
women toward unbiased employers; if bias is more ubiquitous then a gender wage gap 
may emerge. 
Beyond the discrimination literature, this inquiry also touches on several related 
research agendas.  Behavioral finance scholars have examined systematic patterns of 3 
mistaken inference by investors, but that literature has yet to put much emphasis on 
inferences made by investors about the company’s leadership.  Interestingly there is now 
a large literature in corporate finance emphasizing the importance of CEO characteristics 
as determinants of firm decisions and hence outcomes.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
examine a range of characteristics, including the age of the CEO and where they obtained 
their MBA; Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar and Thesmar (2004) examine their social and 
political connections, and Malmendier and Tate (2004) examine their optimism.  Each 
finds large effects of CEO characteristics on firm performance.  Other research at the 
intersection of gender and finance includes: Bertrand and Hallock’s (2001) analysis of the 
relative pay of male and female CEO’s which suggests that the wage disparity is largely 
explained by job and worker characteristics; Lee and James’ (2003) event study evidence 
suggesting that markets react negatively to the appointment of female CEOS; Mohan and 
Chen’s (2004) finding that IPO pricing is unrelated to CEO gender, and evidence from 
Welbourne (1999) and Catalyst (2004) suggesting relatively better financial performance 
among firms with many senior women. 
In ongoing research, Wolfers (2006) examines analysts earnings forecasts, finding 
that forecast errors are systematically larger for female-headed firms.  This bias is also 
particularly strong among male analysts.  The logic of these financial market based tests 
also extends to other domains, and in ongoing work, I am examining sports betting data 
to determine whether a similar bias applies against (or for) African-American sportsmen. 
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2.  Sample 
The most challenging data limitation is finding a sufficiently large (and systematic) 
collection of data on CEO gender.  I focus on CEO’s simply because they are the most 
visible and arguably the most important company employee.  The only systematic 
collection of CEO gender that I am aware of comes from the Execucomp data, which 
tracks S&P 1500 firms from 1992-2004.  These data identified a total of 64 female 
CEO’s and 4175 male CEOs.  Over this 15 year sample 1.3% of CEO-years were worked 
by women. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics by CEO gender, weighting each CEO by their 
tenure.  The samples of male- and female-headed firms are surprisingly similar in terms 
of size, book-to-market value, price-earnings ratios, firm-level betas and even industry 
compositions.  While there are some differences—men tend to head slightly larger and 
more cyclical firms while women are over-represented in retail trade and information 
sectors—these differences should not be exaggerated given the very small sample of 
female CEOs. 
 
Table 1: CEO Gender and Firm Characteristics – Weighted by CEO Tenure 1992-2004 




   10
th percentile  $112m  $155m 
   50
th percentile  $582m  $967m 
   90
th percentile  $8,710m  $9,463m 
Employees    
   10
th percentile  293  445 
   50
th percentile  3076  4470 
   90
th percentile  25,000  39,000 
Book-to-market value    
   10
th percentile  0.12  0.14 
   50
th percentile  0.45  0.26 
   90
th percentile  1.06  0.92 5 
Price/Earnings Ratio    
   10
th percentile  -9.3  -8.6 
   50
th percentile  17.7  16.5 
   90
th percentile  52.2  44.0 
Beta (Year-end)    
   10
th percentile  0.26  0.25 
   50
th percentile  0.81  0.86 
   90
th percentile  1.70  1.71 
Industry (NAICS) 
[Number of CEO’s] 
  
   Agriculture  0% [0]  0.4% [16] 
   Mining  0% [0]  4.2% [153] 
   Utilities  2.6% [2]  5.7% [227] 
   Construction  0.7% [1]  1.2% [49] 
   Manufacturing  41.6% [25]  42.2% [1,808] 
   Wholesale Trade  0% [0]  3.5% [154] 
   Retail Trade  17.1% [10]  6.5% [280] 
   Transport  0% [0]  3.0% [116] 
   Information   12.4% [10]  8.4% [378] 
   Finance & Insurance  7.6% [2]  13.1% [491] 
   Real Estate  1.0% [1]  0.8% [33] 
   Professional Services  6.3% [7]  3.4% [158] 
   Administration  6.4% [4]  2.0% [104] 
   Education  0% [0]  0.3% [11] 
   Health Care  3.1% [2]  1.9% [83] 
   Arts & Entertainment  0% [0]  0.4% [19] 
   Accommodation & Food  0% [0]  2.4% [101] 
   Other Services  1.1% [1]  0.3% [20] 
   Unclassified  0% [0]  0.4% [14] 
CEO Tenure    
   10
th percentile  0.6 years  0.6 years 
   50
th percentile  2.8 years  3.2 years 
   90
th percentile  8.5 years  8.4 years 
CEO appointed    
   10
th percentile  Pre-1992  Pre-1992 
   50
th percentile  June 1995  December 1992 
   90
th percentile  July 2001  March 2000 
 
  There are two important respects in which female-headed firms are different from 
those headed by men.  First, as Figure 1 shows, the number of female CEOs has been 
creeping up through time, from a low of 4 in January 1992, to 34 in December 1994.  
(The time series variation in male CEOs in our sample reflects the changing coverage of 
CEO start and end dates in the Execucomp sample.)  Female CEOs tend to have had 



































































CEO Gender Through Time: Execucomp Sample
 
  The next two sections examine stock returns data, asking: Do female-headed 
firms outperform market expectations? 
 
3.  Long-term stock returns 
Several past studies have focused on measuring market expectations regarding the 
performance of female CEOs.  For instance Lee and James (2004) find that the 
announcement of a new female CEO leads to a negative abnormal return of 3.7% over the 
announcement window, while a new male CEO leads to only a 0.5% decline in the stock 
price.  These data are potentially informative about market perceptions of the ability of 
female CEOs, but they do not tell us whether these perceptions turn out to be accurate.  7 
As such, the event study evidence is consistent with a view that female CEOs perform as 
well as men, but that markets systematically underestimate the ability of women.  Thus 
this paper asks instead: do female-headed firms consistently beat market expectations? 
One obvious way to test this would be to assess whether one could earn excess 
returns by holding stock in female-headed firms, relative to holding male-headed firms.  
Table 2 reports on the returns to holding zero investment portfolios that follow a strategy 
of buying female-headed firms and shorting male-headed firms.  In columns 1-4 we form 
these portfolios weighting positions proportionately to market capitalization (measured 
two months prior) within the long or short part of the portfolio; in columns 5-8, portfolio 
shares are proportionate to the number of female- or male-headed firms in the sample at 
that point in time.  Both of these strategies yield a series of returns which are then 
regressed on standard factor return series.  The remaining differential, α, is the excess 
return to this portfolio, conditional on risk factors. 
 8 
Table 2: Performance of the Zero-Investment Portfolio 
  Zero Investment Portfolio: Long female-headed firms; Short male-headed firms 
  Monthly Returnst = α + β1*(Markett –R
f
t) + β2*SMB + β3*HMLt + β4*UMDt + εt 
  Value-weighted portfolio      Equal-weighted portfolio 

























































    -0.1347 
(.0859) 




2  .0000  .0483  .2059  .2186 .0000  .0045 .0402  .0796 
N  156  156  156  156 156  156 156  156 
Notes:  (Standard errors reported in parentheses) 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Market return measured as excess return of CRSP-weighted index minus the one-month Treasury 
rate.  Size, Value, Momentum are factor returns downloaded from Kenneth French’s hompage.  
 
Excess returns to following this strategy are typically somewhat negative, with point 
estimates suggesting somewhat negative monthly returns of between one- and three-
tenths of a percentage point.  Equally, in no case are these returns statistically different 
from the efficient markets null of zero.  Not surprisingly this portfolio is somewhat 
exposed to the size factor, although momentum also helps explain returns. 
In Table 3 I turn to a related approach for measuring excess returns, running a series 
of Fama-Macbeth regressions.  Specifically, for each month in the sample I run a 
regression: 
Returnsi,t = αt + α
Female
t*Female CEOi,t + Zi,tλ + εi,t 
where i denotes an individual company, t denotes a month in my 1992-2004 sample, 
Return is the monthly stock return from CRSP, the variable Female CEO is a variable 9 
denoting the proportion of the month in which the firm was run by a women, and Zi,t is a 
vector of the usual firm characteristics included as controls: whether the firm is traded on 
the Nasdaq, whether it is a member of the S&P500, its book-to-market ratio and dividend 
yield (both measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year), its stock price, the natural 
logs of market capitalization and trading volume (the latter three variables measured with 
a two month lag), and three standard momentum variables: returns over the previous 2-3 
months, 4-6 months and 7-12 months.  I follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s (2003) data 
appendix in constructing the panel of firm characteristics. 
The coefficient α
Female is a measure of the differential performance of female-
headed firms in that month, controlling for other factors that affected the cross-section of 
returns.  Running these regressions separately for each month yields a time series for 
α
Female, the differential return to holding female-headed firms. 
Column one shows the average coefficient in a very sparse regression in which 
each month’s returns are modeled only as a function only of CEO gender.  This result 
is—by construction—identical to that shown in Table 2.  Because we might expect the 
true ability of a CEO to be revealed during the first few years of their tenure (and hence 
any mis-assessments to be reversed during that period), the specifications in columns 2 
and 5 also include a dummy variable for whether a CEO was in the first four years of his 
or her tenure, and the same variable, interacted with the female CEO variable.  More 
complete specifications are reported in columns three and six, which not only control for 
other characteristics, but also allowing the effects of these characteristics to vary through 
time.  While the first three columns show the average results through time from running 10 
value-weighted cross-sectional regressions each month, the final three columns report the 
average results from unweighted regressions. 
 
Table 3: Fama-Macbeth Estimates 
  Value-Weighted Regression Equal-Weighted Regression 












Female CEO &  

















Nasdaq firm?     0.0057
***
(.0023) 
   0.0049
*** 
(.0017) 
S&P 500 firm?     0.0008 
(.0015) 
   0.0059
*** 
(.0013) 
Book-to-Markett-1     0.0045 
(.0028) 
  -0.0002 
(.0016) 
Ln(Market Capt-2)   -0.0002
(.0018) 
  -0.0020 
(.0016) 





Volumet-2     -0.0009
(.0019) 
  -0.0010 
(.0016) 
Dividend Yieldt-1     0.0469 
(.0446) 
  -0.0209 
(.0280) 
















Notes:   (Standard errors reported in parentheses) 
***, 
**, 
* denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% or 10% 
 
As with Table 2, these results show no statistically significant difference in the 
returns to holding stock in female-headed firms.  Moreover, while one might expect such 
an effect to be most strongly present in the first few years of a CEO’s tenure, there is no 
statistically significant evidence of this, either. 
While the Fama-Macbeth approach allows one to control for many firm 
characteristics, it relies on a particular functional form to facilitate regression-adjusted 
comparisons of all female-headed firms to male-headed firms.  It may be more 11 
informative to compare the performance of firms that are in – at least on observables – 
otherwise very similar.  As such Table 3 reports on a matching approach.  Specifically for 
each female-headed firm in each month, I begin by stratifying by the 49-industry groups 
described in Fama and French (1997) ensuring that I only match female-headed firms 
with a male-headed firm within the same narrow industry.  I then match each female-
headed firm to the male headed firm whose market capitalization two months earlier was 
most similar.  Thus the unit of observation now is not the monthly return to an entire 
portfolio, but rather a comparison of the return to holding a female-headed firm versus its 
match partner.  This comparison is shown in column one.  In column two, I sort first by 
industry, and then within industry sort the firms into whether their book-to-market ratios 
(measured two months earlier) were above or below the industry median in the sample 
for that month, and within this double-sort, the matched firm is then the male-headed firm 
whose market capitalization (two months prior) was most similar to that of the female-
headed firm. 
Table 4: Matching Estimates 
Average Monthly Returns: Female-headed firms and Matching male-headed firms 
  Matching by 
industry then 
size 
Matching by industry, 
whether book-to-
market is above median 
and then size 












Sample size  3263 3261 
Notes: (Standard error reported in parentheses) 
 
In sum, across the three approaches to measuring differential returns – portfolio 
returns, Fama-Macbeth regressions and matching estimates – the difference in returns 12 
between female- and male-headed firms are not statistically discernible from zero.  As 
such, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that markets do not systematically 
under-estimate female-headed firms.  However it is worth emphasizing just how 
imprecise these results are, as a close inspection of the standard errors reveals that these 
results do not constitute a particularly convincing demonstration of the absence of 
discrimination.  Under each approach the estimate of the differential monthly returns has 
a standard error of around one-quarter to one-half of a percentage point, suggesting that 
even differences in annual returns of as much as 5% would not be detectable.  That is, the 
sample of female CEOs of S&P 1500 firms is just too small to find evidence of excess 
long-period returns to female-headed firms, even if the misperceptions held by traders are 
quite large.  The next section makes this point more directly. 
 
4.  Interpretation: Lack of Power 
While the tests of statistical significance presented above do not reject a null of zero 
(and hence of no discrimination), this is not the only interesting hypothesis worth 
considering.  Specifically, the sign of the estimated effects is in most cases negative, 
which may be inconsistent with a view that markets systematically underestimate the 
ability of female CEOs.  We now turn to asking whether these estimates statistically 
falsify a prior that female CEOs are substantially under-estimated.  In order to do so, one 
needs to be more precise about such a prior. 
In this example, we will consider the implications of investors who falsely believe 
that female CEOs produce 10 percent lower corporate earnings than male CEOs.  
Traders’ valuations will reflect their expectations of the net present value of the firm’s 13 
earnings.  Thus were a female CEO to live forever, the valuation of her firm would be 
10% lower than the value of a male-headed firm.  However, the investor takes account of 
the fact that average CEO tenure is about 10 years, and hence both discounts the future 
(at 0.5% per month) and each month assigns a 0.8% chance of a change in CEO.  Based 
on CEO hires since 2000, the investor believes that there is about a 2.5% chance that the 
new CEO will be a woman (whom he would also under-estimate), and for simplicity, 
assumes that this is independent of whether the previous CEO was female.  Embedding 
these assumptions in a monthly model generates a 3.9% discount for female-headed 
firms.  Thus these illustrative numbers suggest that the announcement of a female CEO 
should lead stock prices to decline by nearly 4%, which is close to Lee and James’ (2003) 
event study estimate.  Naturally the event study tells us only about market perceptions of 
ability. 
  Now if the perceptions of lower ability turn out to be false, what are the 
implications for earnings and capital gains associated with holding female-headed firms?  
Each quarter the firm will announce earnings 10% higher than the market expected.  This 
is obviously reasonably large relative to earnings surprises, and so examining returns 
around earnings announcement dates should have some power to find this. 
  However the implications for long-term stock returns are less easy to discern and 
depend on whether investors learn about the CEOs true ability.  If investors stick 
stubbornly to their biased beliefs even in the face of accumulating evidence of good 
performance by the firm under the female CEO’s stewardship, the returns to holding the 
stock will only be higher by the amount by which earnings in that year exceeded 
expectations.  Given the perception of a 10% ability differential and a 6% annual 14 
discount rate (which pins down the price-earnings ratio), this suggests excess annual 
returns of only 0.6%, although given the persistence of misperceptions, these excess 
returns are enjoyed every year.  Of course, this represents the extreme case where 
investors do not update their beliefs at all.  In the opposite extreme if investors learn the 
CEO’s true ability in her first period in the job, the initial “female discount” will be 
reversed immediately, yielding maximum excess returns of 3.9% in the first period, and 
zero thereafter.  It might be more realistic to believe that it takes investors four years to 
falsify their initial misperceptions about the ability of a specific female CEO.  If this is 
the case, the initial 3.9% decline in value following the appointment of a female CEO 
would be unwound within four years, yielding around an extra 1% per year capital gain, 
as well as annual earnings surprises that start at 0.6%, declining to 0% by the fourth year. 
All told, this example suggests that even if financial markets substantially under-
estimate the ability of female CEOs (in this example by 10%), then excess returns to 
holding stock in female-headed firms is likely to be less than 1.5 percent per year or 
around 0.1% per month, and to last for only a few years.  As such, even despite the fact 
that the point estimates in Tables 2-4 suggest negative excess returns to holding stock in 
female-headed firms, the standard errors are sufficiently large that they cannot reject a 
null that excess returns are sufficiently positive as to be consistent with substantial bias 
against female CEOs.  As such, the best conclusion from this analysis is that differences 
in long-term returns to holding stock in female- and male-headed companies cannot (yet) 
falsify a null hypothesis that investors under-, or over-estimate the ability of 
female CEOs. 15 
The lack of power suggests two alternative research strategies for those interested 
in estimating whether financial markets under-estimate female CEOs.  First, we could 
simply wait for more data to come in.  As it stands, the female CEOs in my sample have 
generated a total of 3369 female CEO-months; monthly (market-model adjusted) returns 
have a standard deviation of around 15%, and as such measuring excess returns in 
female-headed firms yields a standard error of around 0.15/√3168 = 0.26% per month, or 
3% per year.  In order to get the standard error down to 1%, we would need around ten 
times this sample size.  Obviously extending the sample back through time will not help 
much.  Going forward, there are about 35 women heading S&P 1500 firms, and this is 
not increasing particularly rapidly (over the period 2000-2004 2.5% of new CEO 
appointments within the S&P 1500 were women, suggesting that until this hazard rate 
changes, we are currently close to the steady state).  As such, it will take until around the 
year 2020 to generate a sample of 10,000 female CEO-months. 
  Given these calculations, it seems much more promising to examine whether the 
quarterly earnings of female-headed firms outperform market expectations, or to examine 
stock returns specifically around the times that earnings surprises are announced.  This is 
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